Disclosure incentives when competing firms have common ownership

Jihwon Park, J. Sani, N. Shroff, Hal White

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper examines whether common ownership – i.e., instances where investors simultaneously own significant stakes in competing firms – affects voluntary disclosure. We argue that common ownership (i) reduces proprietary cost concerns of disclosure, and (ii) incentivizes firms to “internalize” the externality benefits of their disclosure for co-owned peer firms. Accordingly, we find a positive relation between common ownership and disclosure. Evidence from cross-sectional tests and a quasi-natural experiment based on financial institution mergers help mitigate concerns that our results are explained by an omitted variable bias or reverse causality. Finally, we find that common ownership is associated with increased market liquidity.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)387-415
Number of pages29
JournalJournal of Accounting and Economics
Volume67
Issue number2-3
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2019

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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