Analyse critique de l’étude « Les répercussions de la dispersion verticale des salaires: Observations expérimentales en context budgétaire »

Translated title of the contribution: Discussion of “the effects of vertical pay dispersion: Experimental evidence in a budget setting”

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Abstract

Guo, Libby, and Liu (2017) (hereafter GLL), examine how pairs of experimental subjects interact in a game framed as a funding request from a privately informed subordinate to a superior. When the superior’s pay is higher than the subordinate’s, subordinates display more self-serving dishonesty and superiors are more tolerant of it than when their pay is the same. In this discussion, I compare GLL’s design with an ultimatum game, consider additional tensions that arise in pay-level comparisons, address the applicability of their results, and suggest some extensions. I conclude by calling for new theory that regularizes GLL’s surprising findings.

Translated title of the contributionDiscussion of “the effects of vertical pay dispersion: Experimental evidence in a budget setting”
Original languageFrench
Pages (from-to)577-581
Number of pages5
JournalContemporary Accounting Research
Volume34
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2017

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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