Analyse critique de l’étude « Les répercussions de la dispersion verticale des salaires: Observations expérimentales en context budgétaire »

Translated title of the contribution: Discussion of “the effects of vertical pay dispersion: Experimental evidence in a budget setting”

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Guo, Libby, and Liu (2017) (hereafter GLL), examine how pairs of experimental subjects interact in a game framed as a funding request from a privately informed subordinate to a superior. When the superior’s pay is higher than the subordinate’s, subordinates display more self-serving dishonesty and superiors are more tolerant of it than when their pay is the same. In this discussion, I compare GLL’s design with an ultimatum game, consider additional tensions that arise in pay-level comparisons, address the applicability of their results, and suggest some extensions. I conclude by calling for new theory that regularizes GLL’s surprising findings.

Original languageFrench
Pages (from-to)577-581
Number of pages5
JournalContemporary Accounting Research
Volume34
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2017

Fingerprint

Funding
Dishonesty
Ultimatum game

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

@article{cf320e18f3284177b0cfd8e9b691feed,
title = "Analyse critique de l’{\'e}tude « Les r{\'e}percussions de la dispersion verticale des salaires: Observations exp{\'e}rimentales en context budg{\'e}taire »",
abstract = "Guo, Libby, and Liu (2017) (hereafter GLL), examine how pairs of experimental subjects interact in a game framed as a funding request from a privately informed subordinate to a superior. When the superior’s pay is higher than the subordinate’s, subordinates display more self-serving dishonesty and superiors are more tolerant of it than when their pay is the same. In this discussion, I compare GLL’s design with an ultimatum game, consider additional tensions that arise in pay-level comparisons, address the applicability of their results, and suggest some extensions. I conclude by calling for new theory that regularizes GLL’s surprising findings.",
author = "Steven Huddart",
year = "2017",
month = "3",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1111/1911-3846.12248",
language = "French",
volume = "34",
pages = "577--581",
journal = "Contemporary Accounting Research",
issn = "0823-9150",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Analyse critique de l’étude « Les répercussions de la dispersion verticale des salaires

T2 - Observations expérimentales en context budgétaire »

AU - Huddart, Steven

PY - 2017/3/1

Y1 - 2017/3/1

N2 - Guo, Libby, and Liu (2017) (hereafter GLL), examine how pairs of experimental subjects interact in a game framed as a funding request from a privately informed subordinate to a superior. When the superior’s pay is higher than the subordinate’s, subordinates display more self-serving dishonesty and superiors are more tolerant of it than when their pay is the same. In this discussion, I compare GLL’s design with an ultimatum game, consider additional tensions that arise in pay-level comparisons, address the applicability of their results, and suggest some extensions. I conclude by calling for new theory that regularizes GLL’s surprising findings.

AB - Guo, Libby, and Liu (2017) (hereafter GLL), examine how pairs of experimental subjects interact in a game framed as a funding request from a privately informed subordinate to a superior. When the superior’s pay is higher than the subordinate’s, subordinates display more self-serving dishonesty and superiors are more tolerant of it than when their pay is the same. In this discussion, I compare GLL’s design with an ultimatum game, consider additional tensions that arise in pay-level comparisons, address the applicability of their results, and suggest some extensions. I conclude by calling for new theory that regularizes GLL’s surprising findings.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85006869766&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85006869766&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/1911-3846.12248

DO - 10.1111/1911-3846.12248

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85006869766

VL - 34

SP - 577

EP - 581

JO - Contemporary Accounting Research

JF - Contemporary Accounting Research

SN - 0823-9150

IS - 1

ER -