Distributed coverage games for mobile visual sensors (I): Reaching the set of Nash equilibria

Minghui Zhu, Sonia Martínez

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

22 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We formulate a coverage optimization problem for mobile visual sensor networks as a repeated multi-player game. Each visual sensor tries to optimize its own coverage while minimizing the processing cost. The rewards for the sensing are not prior information for the agents. We present a synchronous distributed learning algorithm where each sensor only remembers its own utility values and actions played during the last two time steps. The algorithm is proven to be convergent in probability to the set of (restricted) Nash equilibria from which none has incentive to unilaterally deviate.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009
Pages169-174
Number of pages6
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2009
Event48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009 - Shanghai, China
Duration: Dec 15 2009Dec 18 2009

Publication series

NameProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
ISSN (Print)0191-2216

Other

Other48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009
CountryChina
CityShanghai
Period12/15/0912/18/09

Fingerprint

Nash Equilibrium
Coverage
Game
Sensor
Sensors
Prior Information
Distributed Algorithms
Incentives
Reward
Parallel algorithms
Learning algorithms
Sensor networks
Sensor Networks
Learning Algorithm
Sensing
Optimise
Optimization Problem
Costs
Processing
Vision

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

Cite this

Zhu, M., & Martínez, S. (2009). Distributed coverage games for mobile visual sensors (I): Reaching the set of Nash equilibria. In Proceedings of the 48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009 (pp. 169-174). [5399545] (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control). https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2009.5399544
Zhu, Minghui ; Martínez, Sonia. / Distributed coverage games for mobile visual sensors (I) : Reaching the set of Nash equilibria. Proceedings of the 48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009. 2009. pp. 169-174 (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control).
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Zhu, M & Martínez, S 2009, Distributed coverage games for mobile visual sensors (I): Reaching the set of Nash equilibria. in Proceedings of the 48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009., 5399545, Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, pp. 169-174, 48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009, Shanghai, China, 12/15/09. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2009.5399544

Distributed coverage games for mobile visual sensors (I) : Reaching the set of Nash equilibria. / Zhu, Minghui; Martínez, Sonia.

Proceedings of the 48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009. 2009. p. 169-174 5399545 (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Zhu M, Martínez S. Distributed coverage games for mobile visual sensors (I): Reaching the set of Nash equilibria. In Proceedings of the 48th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, CDC/CCC 2009. 2009. p. 169-174. 5399545. (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control). https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2009.5399544