Do co-opted directors mitigate managerial myopia? Evidence from R&D investments

Pandej Chintrakarn, Pornsit Jiraporn, Sameh Sakr, Sangmook Lee

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We explore the effect of co-opted directors on R&D investments. Co-opted directors are those appointed after the incumbent CEO assumes office. Because a co-opted board represents a weakened governance mechanism that diminishes the probability of executive removal, managers are less likely to be removed and are more motivated to make long-term investments. Our evidence shows that board co-option leads to significantly higher R&D investments. To draw a causal inference, we execute a quasi-natural experiment using an exogenous regulatory shock from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). Our results reveal that the effect of board co-option on R&D is more likely causal.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)285-289
Number of pages5
JournalFinance Research Letters
Volume17
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 2016

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Managerial myopia
Incumbents
Governance mechanisms
Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Causal inference
Chief executive officer
Managers
Natural experiment

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance

Cite this

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Do co-opted directors mitigate managerial myopia? Evidence from R&D investments. / Chintrakarn, Pandej; Jiraporn, Pornsit; Sakr, Sameh; Lee, Sangmook.

In: Finance Research Letters, Vol. 17, 01.05.2016, p. 285-289.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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