Does founding family control affect earnings management?

Pornsit Jiraporn, Peter J. DaDalt

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

52 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Because of concentrated ownership stakes, board composition and longer-investment horizons, founding-family controlled firms provide an interesting setting for examining issues relating to governance and control. Anderson and Reeb (2003a, b, 2004), find that the founding-family controlled structure results in superior stock market and accounting performance and lower cost of debt compared to their nonfamily controlled counterparts. We add to their findings by examining the relationships between founding family control and earnings management. The unique characteristics of family controlled firms could insulate these firms from pressures to manage earnings. Our results support this notion, and find that family firms are significantly less likely to manage earnings.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)113-119
Number of pages7
JournalApplied Economics Letters
Volume16
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 3 2009

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Earnings management
Family control
Investment horizon
Cost of debt
Family firms
Governance
Stock market performance
Accounting performance
Board composition
Concentrated ownership

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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Does founding family control affect earnings management? / Jiraporn, Pornsit; DaDalt, Peter J.

In: Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 16, No. 2, 03.02.2009, p. 113-119.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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