TY - JOUR
T1 - Dynamic game theoretic model of multi-layer infrastructure networks
AU - Zhang, Pengcheng
AU - Peeta, Srinivas
AU - Friesz, Terry
N1 - Funding Information:
This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. CMS-0116342. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.
PY - 2005/6
Y1 - 2005/6
N2 - Due to similarities in terms of network structure and interactions among them, most infrastructure systems can be viewed as coupled layers of a generalized transportation network in which the passenger, freight, data, water, and energy flows are the commodities in the different layers. The coupling is due to the varying degrees of interactions among these layers in terms of shared physical networks, budgetary constraints, socio-economic environments, environmental concerns, information/other resources, and in particular, functional interdependencies. However, these interactions are normally ignored in the engineering planning, design and analysis of infrastructure systems. Identifying and understanding these interactions using a holistic perspective can lead to more efficient infrastructure systems. This paper presents a preliminary network flow equilibrium model of dynamic multi-layer infrastructure networks in the form of a differential game involving two essential time scales. In particular, three coupled network layers - automobiles, urban freight and data - are modeled as being comprised of Cournot-Nash dynamic agents. An agent-based simulation solution structure is introduced to solve the flow equilibrium and optimal budget allocation problem for these three layers under the assumption of a super authority that oversees investments in the infrastructure of all three technologies and thereby creates a dynamic Stackelberg leader-follower game.
AB - Due to similarities in terms of network structure and interactions among them, most infrastructure systems can be viewed as coupled layers of a generalized transportation network in which the passenger, freight, data, water, and energy flows are the commodities in the different layers. The coupling is due to the varying degrees of interactions among these layers in terms of shared physical networks, budgetary constraints, socio-economic environments, environmental concerns, information/other resources, and in particular, functional interdependencies. However, these interactions are normally ignored in the engineering planning, design and analysis of infrastructure systems. Identifying and understanding these interactions using a holistic perspective can lead to more efficient infrastructure systems. This paper presents a preliminary network flow equilibrium model of dynamic multi-layer infrastructure networks in the form of a differential game involving two essential time scales. In particular, three coupled network layers - automobiles, urban freight and data - are modeled as being comprised of Cournot-Nash dynamic agents. An agent-based simulation solution structure is introduced to solve the flow equilibrium and optimal budget allocation problem for these three layers under the assumption of a super authority that oversees investments in the infrastructure of all three technologies and thereby creates a dynamic Stackelberg leader-follower game.
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U2 - 10.1007/s11067-005-2627-0
DO - 10.1007/s11067-005-2627-0
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:23144445487
VL - 5
SP - 147
EP - 178
JO - Networks and Spatial Economics
JF - Networks and Spatial Economics
SN - 1566-113X
IS - 2
ER -