Dynamic Oligopolistic Competition in an Electric Power Network and Impacts of Infrastructure Disruptions

Reetabrata Mookherjee, Benjamin F. Hobbs, Terry Lee Friesz, Matthew A. Rigdon

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This chapter puts forward a dynamic game theoretic model of oligopolistic competition in spatially distributed electric power markets having a 24 - hour planning horizon. The purpose of this model is to allow quick testing of the effects of changes to the underlying electric power network. Therefore, the game is formulated as a nonlinear complementarity problem that can be solved effi ciently using sequential linearization and a Lemke's type algorithm for each resulting linear complementarity problem. The underlying electric power network is represented by the widely accepted linearized DC approximation, allowing the substitution of power transmission distribution factors for Kirchhoff's energy balance and voltage laws. The model is tested on a 15 - node representation of the northwest European electricity market formed by Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands. The effects of various infrastructure disruptions, in the form of network capacity changes, are simulated.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationEconomic Market Design and Planning for Electric Power Systems
PublisherJohn Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Pages87-111
Number of pages25
ISBN (Print)9780470472088
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 7 2009

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Energy balance
Power transmission
Linearization
Substitution reactions
Planning
Testing
Electric potential
Power markets

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Energy(all)

Cite this

Mookherjee, R., Hobbs, B. F., Friesz, T. L., & Rigdon, M. A. (2009). Dynamic Oligopolistic Competition in an Electric Power Network and Impacts of Infrastructure Disruptions. In Economic Market Design and Planning for Electric Power Systems (pp. 87-111). John Wiley & Sons, Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470529164.ch5
Mookherjee, Reetabrata ; Hobbs, Benjamin F. ; Friesz, Terry Lee ; Rigdon, Matthew A. / Dynamic Oligopolistic Competition in an Electric Power Network and Impacts of Infrastructure Disruptions. Economic Market Design and Planning for Electric Power Systems. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2009. pp. 87-111
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Mookherjee, R, Hobbs, BF, Friesz, TL & Rigdon, MA 2009, Dynamic Oligopolistic Competition in an Electric Power Network and Impacts of Infrastructure Disruptions. in Economic Market Design and Planning for Electric Power Systems. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., pp. 87-111. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470529164.ch5

Dynamic Oligopolistic Competition in an Electric Power Network and Impacts of Infrastructure Disruptions. / Mookherjee, Reetabrata; Hobbs, Benjamin F.; Friesz, Terry Lee; Rigdon, Matthew A.

Economic Market Design and Planning for Electric Power Systems. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2009. p. 87-111.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

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Mookherjee R, Hobbs BF, Friesz TL, Rigdon MA. Dynamic Oligopolistic Competition in an Electric Power Network and Impacts of Infrastructure Disruptions. In Economic Market Design and Planning for Electric Power Systems. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2009. p. 87-111 https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470529164.ch5