Dynamic pricing in an urban freight environment

Terry Lee Friesz, Reetabrata Mookherjee, José Holguín-Veras, Matthew A. Rigdon

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

23 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a dynamic, game theoretic model of dynamic pricing in an urban freight environment with three main entities: sellers, transporters and receivers. The sellers and transporters are modelled as non-cooperative Cournot-Nash agents. The sellers compete to capture receiver input factor demands, while the transporters compete to capture the transportation demand generated by the seller/receiver transactions. Each competing agent's extremal problem is formulated as an optimal control problem and the set of these coupled optimal control problems is transformed into a differential variational inequality representing the general Nash equilibrium problem. A nonlinear complementarity problem is also formulated and used to solve a numerical example.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)305-324
Number of pages20
JournalTransportation Research Part B: Methodological
Volume42
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2008

Fingerprint

pricing
recipient
Costs
transaction
Freight
Seller
Dynamic pricing
demand
Optimal control

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Transportation
  • Management Science and Operations Research

Cite this

Friesz, Terry Lee ; Mookherjee, Reetabrata ; Holguín-Veras, José ; Rigdon, Matthew A. / Dynamic pricing in an urban freight environment. In: Transportation Research Part B: Methodological. 2008 ; Vol. 42, No. 4. pp. 305-324.
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Dynamic pricing in an urban freight environment. / Friesz, Terry Lee; Mookherjee, Reetabrata; Holguín-Veras, José; Rigdon, Matthew A.

In: Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Vol. 42, No. 4, 01.01.2008, p. 305-324.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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