Abstract
In this paper, we propose a dynamic, game theoretic model of dynamic pricing in an urban freight environment with three main entities: sellers, transporters and receivers. The sellers and transporters are modelled as non-cooperative Cournot-Nash agents. The sellers compete to capture receiver input factor demands, while the transporters compete to capture the transportation demand generated by the seller/receiver transactions. Each competing agent's extremal problem is formulated as an optimal control problem and the set of these coupled optimal control problems is transformed into a differential variational inequality representing the general Nash equilibrium problem. A nonlinear complementarity problem is also formulated and used to solve a numerical example.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 305-324 |
| Number of pages | 20 |
| Journal | Transportation Research Part B: Methodological |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 2008 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Transportation
- Management Science and Operations Research
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Dynamic pricing in an urban freight environment. / Friesz, Terry Lee; Mookherjee, Reetabrata; Holguín-Veras, José; Rigdon, Matthew A.
In: Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Vol. 42, No. 4, 01.01.2008, p. 305-324.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Dynamic pricing in an urban freight environment
AU - Friesz, Terry Lee
AU - Mookherjee, Reetabrata
AU - Holguín-Veras, José
AU - Rigdon, Matthew A.
PY - 2008/1/1
Y1 - 2008/1/1
N2 - In this paper, we propose a dynamic, game theoretic model of dynamic pricing in an urban freight environment with three main entities: sellers, transporters and receivers. The sellers and transporters are modelled as non-cooperative Cournot-Nash agents. The sellers compete to capture receiver input factor demands, while the transporters compete to capture the transportation demand generated by the seller/receiver transactions. Each competing agent's extremal problem is formulated as an optimal control problem and the set of these coupled optimal control problems is transformed into a differential variational inequality representing the general Nash equilibrium problem. A nonlinear complementarity problem is also formulated and used to solve a numerical example.
AB - In this paper, we propose a dynamic, game theoretic model of dynamic pricing in an urban freight environment with three main entities: sellers, transporters and receivers. The sellers and transporters are modelled as non-cooperative Cournot-Nash agents. The sellers compete to capture receiver input factor demands, while the transporters compete to capture the transportation demand generated by the seller/receiver transactions. Each competing agent's extremal problem is formulated as an optimal control problem and the set of these coupled optimal control problems is transformed into a differential variational inequality representing the general Nash equilibrium problem. A nonlinear complementarity problem is also formulated and used to solve a numerical example.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=39749145142&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=39749145142&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.trb.2007.08.001
DO - 10.1016/j.trb.2007.08.001
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:39749145142
VL - 42
SP - 305
EP - 324
JO - Transportation Research, Series B: Methodological
JF - Transportation Research, Series B: Methodological
SN - 0191-2615
IS - 4
ER -