ENFORCING TIME‐INCONSISTENT REGULATION

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Passage of legislation enacting a regulatory program does not ensure that the program will be successfully implemented. Certain regulations require significant long‐term investment by firms prior to their enforcement date. If firms do not engage in the desired investment, enforcing the regulations may generate significant welfare losses for society. Firms know this and may behave strategically by not undertaking the investment, generating the well‐known time‐inconsistency problem. A game‐theoretic model presented here shows how the time‐inconsistency problem can be alleviated using administrative procedures as a device to commit an agency to carrying out its bureaucratic mission.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)639-648
Number of pages10
JournalEconomic Inquiry
Volume30
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1992

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Legislation
Welfare loss
Enforcement

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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ENFORCING TIME‐INCONSISTENT REGULATION. / Kleit, Andrew N.

In: Economic Inquiry, Vol. 30, No. 4, 10.1992, p. 639-648.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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