Entrepreneurial behaviour in the MNC: an extended agency theory analysis of the parent-subsidiary relationship and subsidiary initiative

William Harold Johnson, John W. Medcof

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Entrepreneurial activity in the form of strategic subsidiary initiatives is examined theoretically utilising an extended agency theory perspective and extant empirical findings. The analysis using traditional agency theory suggests that entrepreneurial subsidiary initiatives are unlikely given the risk necessary to put forth an initiative and lack of incentives on the part of traditional subsidiary management. In developing an extended principal-agent analysis it is discovered that the risk attitudes of both the parent company and the subsidiary as well as the internal contracting system of the multinational company are rudimentary to a theoretical understanding of subsidiary-driven initiatives. The implications of the analysis are delineated and several propositions developed.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)186-203
Number of pages18
JournalInternational Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management
Volume2
Issue number2-3
StatePublished - Jan 1 2002

Fingerprint

Industry
Entrepreneurial behavior
Agency theory
Subsidiaries
Risk attitude
Parent company
Entrepreneurial activity
Contracting
Incentives
Multinational companies

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business and International Management
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

Cite this

@article{a55563e824ac4b998b1bacb8f228c434,
title = "Entrepreneurial behaviour in the MNC: an extended agency theory analysis of the parent-subsidiary relationship and subsidiary initiative",
abstract = "Entrepreneurial activity in the form of strategic subsidiary initiatives is examined theoretically utilising an extended agency theory perspective and extant empirical findings. The analysis using traditional agency theory suggests that entrepreneurial subsidiary initiatives are unlikely given the risk necessary to put forth an initiative and lack of incentives on the part of traditional subsidiary management. In developing an extended principal-agent analysis it is discovered that the risk attitudes of both the parent company and the subsidiary as well as the internal contracting system of the multinational company are rudimentary to a theoretical understanding of subsidiary-driven initiatives. The implications of the analysis are delineated and several propositions developed.",
author = "Johnson, {William Harold} and Medcof, {John W.}",
year = "2002",
month = "1",
day = "1",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "2",
pages = "186--203",
journal = "International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management",
issn = "1368-275X",
publisher = "Inderscience Enterprises Ltd",
number = "2-3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Entrepreneurial behaviour in the MNC

T2 - an extended agency theory analysis of the parent-subsidiary relationship and subsidiary initiative

AU - Johnson, William Harold

AU - Medcof, John W.

PY - 2002/1/1

Y1 - 2002/1/1

N2 - Entrepreneurial activity in the form of strategic subsidiary initiatives is examined theoretically utilising an extended agency theory perspective and extant empirical findings. The analysis using traditional agency theory suggests that entrepreneurial subsidiary initiatives are unlikely given the risk necessary to put forth an initiative and lack of incentives on the part of traditional subsidiary management. In developing an extended principal-agent analysis it is discovered that the risk attitudes of both the parent company and the subsidiary as well as the internal contracting system of the multinational company are rudimentary to a theoretical understanding of subsidiary-driven initiatives. The implications of the analysis are delineated and several propositions developed.

AB - Entrepreneurial activity in the form of strategic subsidiary initiatives is examined theoretically utilising an extended agency theory perspective and extant empirical findings. The analysis using traditional agency theory suggests that entrepreneurial subsidiary initiatives are unlikely given the risk necessary to put forth an initiative and lack of incentives on the part of traditional subsidiary management. In developing an extended principal-agent analysis it is discovered that the risk attitudes of both the parent company and the subsidiary as well as the internal contracting system of the multinational company are rudimentary to a theoretical understanding of subsidiary-driven initiatives. The implications of the analysis are delineated and several propositions developed.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=4344585018&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=4344585018&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:4344585018

VL - 2

SP - 186

EP - 203

JO - International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management

JF - International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management

SN - 1368-275X

IS - 2-3

ER -