Environmental political business cycles: the case of PM2.5 air pollution in Chinese prefectures

Xun Cao, Genia Kostka, Xu Xu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Chinese local leaders’ behaviors are driven by a career incentive structure in which those delivering better performances are more likely to be promoted. Local leaders signal competence when their superiors actively collect evidence to evaluate their performances: these are years leading to the end of a five-year term. To create better economic performances, local leaders lessen the enforcement of environmental regulations to reduce local industries’ production costs and/or to attract firms from other jurisdictions. Such selective enforcement creates an environmental political business cycle in which pollution increases in years leading to the year of leader turnover. The empirical analysis on a panel of Chinese prefectures of 2002–2010 reveals a U-shaped relationship between a prefecture's party secretary's years in office and its average annual PM2.5 level.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)92-100
Number of pages9
JournalEnvironmental Science and Policy
Volume93
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2019

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business cycle
air pollution
atmospheric pollution
leader
empirical analysis
production cost
incentive
turnover
party secretary
performance
pollution
production costs
industry
economics
jurisdiction
career
firm
regulation
enforcement
evidence

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Geography, Planning and Development
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

Cite this

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Environmental political business cycles : the case of PM2.5 air pollution in Chinese prefectures. / Cao, Xun; Kostka, Genia; Xu, Xu.

In: Environmental Science and Policy, Vol. 93, 01.03.2019, p. 92-100.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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