Extractive industries and corruption: Investigating the effectiveness of EITI as a scrutiny mechanism

Elizabeth Kasekende, Charles Abuka, Mare Sarr

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

21 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The resource curse literature suggests that many countries have failed to exploit their natural resource wealth to finance the growth of their economies. Developing countries appear to be most affected. It is believed that poor governance, including lack of transparency, poor accountability to citizens and corruption, are the main culprits. In 2002, an international initiative sponsored by the UK government and backed by activist groups launched the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) with a view to mitigating the potential negative effects of resource wealth. The objective of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of this initiative that has gained much traction as a scrutiny mechanism for corruption control. In particular, this paper addresses two key questions: First, what are the observable factors that lead a country to voluntarily join the EITI? Second, does EITI membership leads to greater corruption control? Using the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) control of corruption index, we find that EITI membership has not resulted in reduced corruption scores.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)117-128
Number of pages12
JournalResources Policy
Volume48
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2016

Fingerprint

corruption
transparency
industry
governance
accountability
resource
resources
finance
natural resources
natural resource
developing world
extractive industry
Extractive industries
Transparency
Corruption
developing country
citizen
responsibility
economy
lack

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
  • Law

Cite this

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Extractive industries and corruption : Investigating the effectiveness of EITI as a scrutiny mechanism. / Kasekende, Elizabeth; Abuka, Charles; Sarr, Mare.

In: Resources Policy, Vol. 48, 01.06.2016, p. 117-128.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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