Fault injection attacks on emerging non-volatile memory and countermeasures

Mohammad Nasim Imtiaz Khan, Swaroop Ghosh

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Emerging Non-Volatile Memories (NVMs) suffer from high and asymmetric read/write current and long write latency which can result in supply noise such as supply voltage droop and ground bounce. The magnitude of supply noise depends on the old data and the new data that is being written (for write operation) or on the stored data (for read operation). In this paper, we show that the adversary can write specific data pattern (that results in deterministic supply noise) in their memory space to launch, i) Denial of Service (DoS) attack (total write failure), and ii) specific polarity fault (i.e., fault injection) attack in victim’s memory space sharing the same power rails with the adversary’s memory space. These attacks are specifically possible if exhaustive testing of the memory for all patterns, all possible location combinations, all possible parallel read/write conditions are not performed under bit-to-bit process variations and, specified (-10°C to 90°C) and unspecified temperature ranges (i.e., less than -10°C and greater than 90°C). Simulation result indicates that adversary can launch DoS attack on victim’s write operation by injecting more than 120mV of supply noise to victim’s write location. The adversary can also launch 0 ? 1 polarity fault injection attack on victim’s write operation by injecting supply noise greater than 50mV but shorter than 120mV to victim’s write location. Furthermore, the adversary can cause data ‘1’ read failure by injecting more than 150mV of supply noise to victim’s read location.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy, HASP 2018
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
ISBN (Electronic)9781450365000
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2 2018
Event7th International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy, HASP 2018 - Los Angeles, United States
Duration: Jun 2 2018Jun 2 2018

Publication series

NameACM International Conference Proceeding Series

Other

Other7th International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy, HASP 2018
CountryUnited States
CityLos Angeles
Period6/2/186/2/18

Fingerprint

Data storage equipment
Rails
Testing
Electric potential
Temperature
Denial-of-service attack

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Human-Computer Interaction
  • Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

Khan, M. N. I., & Ghosh, S. (2018). Fault injection attacks on emerging non-volatile memory and countermeasures. In Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy, HASP 2018 [10] (ACM International Conference Proceeding Series). Association for Computing Machinery. https://doi.org/10.1145/3214292.3214302
Khan, Mohammad Nasim Imtiaz ; Ghosh, Swaroop. / Fault injection attacks on emerging non-volatile memory and countermeasures. Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy, HASP 2018. Association for Computing Machinery, 2018. (ACM International Conference Proceeding Series).
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Khan, MNI & Ghosh, S 2018, Fault injection attacks on emerging non-volatile memory and countermeasures. in Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy, HASP 2018., 10, ACM International Conference Proceeding Series, Association for Computing Machinery, 7th International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy, HASP 2018, Los Angeles, United States, 6/2/18. https://doi.org/10.1145/3214292.3214302

Fault injection attacks on emerging non-volatile memory and countermeasures. / Khan, Mohammad Nasim Imtiaz; Ghosh, Swaroop.

Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy, HASP 2018. Association for Computing Machinery, 2018. 10 (ACM International Conference Proceeding Series).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Khan MNI, Ghosh S. Fault injection attacks on emerging non-volatile memory and countermeasures. In Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy, HASP 2018. Association for Computing Machinery. 2018. 10. (ACM International Conference Proceeding Series). https://doi.org/10.1145/3214292.3214302