TY - JOUR
T1 - Formulating false data injection cyberattacks on pumps’ flow rate resulting in cascading failures in smart water systems
AU - Moazeni, Faegheh
AU - Khazaei, Javad
N1 - Funding Information:
This research was under support from Penn State's center for security research and education (CSRE), United States of America under 2020 Homeland Security Seed Grant.
Funding Information:
This research was under support from Penn State’s center for security research and education (CSRE), United States of America under 2020 Homeland Security Seed Grant.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021
PY - 2021/12
Y1 - 2021/12
N2 - As digital interconnections of smart cities greatly enhance the quality of life for residents, they also introduce challenges related to cybersecurity that may adversely impact critical infrastructure. Smart cities must secure their critical infrastructures against cyberattacks. Water distribution is one of these infrastructures. In this paper, a bi-level optimization model is developed for cyberattacks that can result in physical consequence of multiple node failures in water networks. Unlike the existing research that considered random cyberattacks, the proposed cyber–physical attack model injects targeted false data into pumps’ measurements causing pressure head buildup in targeted nodes. In addition, the injected false data will ensure bypassing the existing water system's state-estimation and bad data detection methods, a condition that was not considered in previously developed attacks. The findings indicate the minimum number of targeted pumps required to create the most severe cascading failures across the water network. The model will identify strategic pumps that are likely to be targeted by cyberattacks, and therefore should be given extra layers of protection by water authorities.
AB - As digital interconnections of smart cities greatly enhance the quality of life for residents, they also introduce challenges related to cybersecurity that may adversely impact critical infrastructure. Smart cities must secure their critical infrastructures against cyberattacks. Water distribution is one of these infrastructures. In this paper, a bi-level optimization model is developed for cyberattacks that can result in physical consequence of multiple node failures in water networks. Unlike the existing research that considered random cyberattacks, the proposed cyber–physical attack model injects targeted false data into pumps’ measurements causing pressure head buildup in targeted nodes. In addition, the injected false data will ensure bypassing the existing water system's state-estimation and bad data detection methods, a condition that was not considered in previously developed attacks. The findings indicate the minimum number of targeted pumps required to create the most severe cascading failures across the water network. The model will identify strategic pumps that are likely to be targeted by cyberattacks, and therefore should be given extra layers of protection by water authorities.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.scs.2021.103370
DO - 10.1016/j.scs.2021.103370
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85116074846
SN - 2210-6707
VL - 75
JO - Sustainable Cities and Society
JF - Sustainable Cities and Society
M1 - 103370
ER -