Herding with collective preferences

S. Nageeb Ali, Navin Kartik

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

27 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper studies a simple model of observational learning where agents care not only about the information of others but also about their actions. We show that despite complex strategic considerations that arise from forward-looking incentives, herd behavior can arise in equilibrium. The model encompasses applications such as sequential elections, public good contributions, and leadership charitable giving.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)601-626
Number of pages26
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume51
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2012

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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