TY - JOUR
T1 - Heuristics and political accountability in complex governance
T2 - An experimental test
AU - Bertelli, Anthony M.
AU - Van Ryzin, Gregg G.
N1 - Funding Information:
This publication was made possible (in part) by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.
Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2020.
Copyright:
Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2020/7
Y1 - 2020/7
N2 - A growing body of empirical work suggests that identifying the actors formally tasked with implementing policy can focus attention away from incumbent politicians. We examine the effects on blame attribution and voting intention of (a) the identifiability of a responsible policy worker (administrator), and (b) the evaluability of the policy work or outcome (policy failure), in the context of programs at two federal agencies (loans by the Small Business Administration and inspections by the U.S. Department of Agriculture). Using a set of online survey experiments with 1105 US adults, we find that the evaluability of a (negative) outcome generally reduces voting intention, but that the identifiability of a policy worker (administrator) tends to shift blame away from the incumbent politician and thus to increase voting intention. These experimental findings provide at least partial support for our theoretical expectations.
AB - A growing body of empirical work suggests that identifying the actors formally tasked with implementing policy can focus attention away from incumbent politicians. We examine the effects on blame attribution and voting intention of (a) the identifiability of a responsible policy worker (administrator), and (b) the evaluability of the policy work or outcome (policy failure), in the context of programs at two federal agencies (loans by the Small Business Administration and inspections by the U.S. Department of Agriculture). Using a set of online survey experiments with 1105 US adults, we find that the evaluability of a (negative) outcome generally reduces voting intention, but that the identifiability of a policy worker (administrator) tends to shift blame away from the incumbent politician and thus to increase voting intention. These experimental findings provide at least partial support for our theoretical expectations.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85089815116&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85089815116&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1177/2053168020950080
DO - 10.1177/2053168020950080
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85089815116
VL - 7
JO - Research and Politics
JF - Research and Politics
SN - 2053-1680
IS - 3
ER -