Horizontal concentration and anticompetitive behavior in the central Canadian cement industry: Testing arbitrage cost hypotheses

Andrew Nathan Kleit, Halldor P. Palsson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Consider a market with a small number of firms attempting to collude. If they successfully act as a dominant firm, they will raise price. This in turn will expand output by any fringe firms and thus reduce the market share of the colluding group. Thus, higher prices will decrease concentration over time. Here we test this hypothesis, using a modification of and data from the post-1974 Toronto cement market. The weight of the evidence indicates that market price has a negative effect on concentration, implying that the firms in this market act, with significant though limited, success as a cartel.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1189-1202
Number of pages14
JournalInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Volume17
Issue number8
StatePublished - Nov 1 1999

Fingerprint

Cement industry
Cements
Testing
Costs
Arbitrage

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Industrial relations
  • Aerospace Engineering
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
  • Strategy and Management
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering

Cite this

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