How communication links influence coalition bargaining: A laboratory investigation

Gary E. Bolton, Kalyan Chatterjee, Kathleen L. McGinn

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

Complexity of communication is one of the important factors that distinguishes multilateral negotiation from its bilateral cousin. We investigate how the communication configuration affects a three-person coalition negotiation. Restricting who can communicate with whom strongly influences outcomes, and not always in ways that current theory anticipates. Competitive frictions, including a tendency to communicate offers privately, appear to shape much of what we observe. Our results suggest that parties with weaker alternatives would benefit from a more constrained structure, especially if they can be the conduit of communication, while those endowed with stronger alternatives would do well to work within a more public communication structure that promotes competitive bidding.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationBargaining in the Shadow of the Market
Subtitle of host publicationSelected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining
PublisherWorld Scientific Publishing Co.
Pages113-128
Number of pages16
ISBN (Electronic)9789814447577
ISBN (Print)9814447560, 9789814447560
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2013

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Mathematics(all)

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    Bolton, G. E., Chatterjee, K., & McGinn, K. L. (2013). How communication links influence coalition bargaining: A laboratory investigation. In Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining (pp. 113-128). World Scientific Publishing Co.. https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814447577_0006