How many down? Toward understanding systematic risk in networks

Benjamin Johnson, Aron Laszka, Jens Grossklags

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

The systematic risk of a networked system depends to a large extent on its topology. In this paper, we explore this dependency using a model of risk propagation from the literature on interdependent security games. Our main area of focus is on the number of nodes that go down after an attack takes place. We develop a simulation algorithm to study the effects of such attacks on arbitrary topologies, and apply this simulation to scale-free networks. We investigate by graphical illustration how the outcome distribution of such networks exhibits correlation effects that increase the likelihood of losing more nodes at once - an effect having direct applications to cyber-insurance.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationASIA CCS 2014 - Proceedings of the 9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages495-500
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781450328005
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 4 2014
Event9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, ASIA CCS 2014 - Kyoto, Japan
Duration: Jun 4 2014Jun 6 2014

Publication series

NameASIA CCS 2014 - Proceedings of the 9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security

Other

Other9th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, ASIA CCS 2014
CountryJapan
CityKyoto
Period6/4/146/6/14

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Information Systems

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