How some rules just don't matter

The regulation of lobbyists

David Lynn Lowery, Virginia Gray

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

51 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Brinig, Holcombe, and Schwartzstein (1993) have argued recently that lobby regulation restricts entry into the population of lobbying organizations, and that the number of lobbying organizations then influences legislative activity. However, they analyze only the relationship between the restrictiveness of lobby regulation and legislative activity, thereby assuming that regulation actually reduces numbers of registered interest organizations. We test this assumption with data on state interest organization populations and find little support for it. We consider several other explanations and comment more generally on the status of institutions and their rules in the study of political phenomena.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)139-147
Number of pages9
JournalPublic Choice
Volume91
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1997

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lobby
regulation
organization
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Lobbies
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Lowery, David Lynn ; Gray, Virginia. / How some rules just don't matter : The regulation of lobbyists. In: Public Choice. 1997 ; Vol. 91, No. 2. pp. 139-147.
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How some rules just don't matter : The regulation of lobbyists. / Lowery, David Lynn; Gray, Virginia.

In: Public Choice, Vol. 91, No. 2, 01.01.1997, p. 139-147.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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