How the Unorganized Mass Public (Sometimes) Gets Represented in Regulatory Politics

Susan M. Miller, Christopher Witko, Neal D. Woods

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Many scholars have argued that because consumers are poorly organized, regulatory enforcement will tend to be lax and serve the interests of industry. Considering, however, that elections are one of the main mechanisms by which the public exerts control over policy, surprisingly few studies have examined how electoral incentives may spur the government to regulate vigorously on behalf of consumers. We argue that when the threat of electoral accountability is greater, regulatory activities will serve the interests of the public, even if they impose costs on industry. We test this theoretical expectation by analyzing state regulatory activity in the wake of exogenous storms and natural disasters, which provide us with important theoretical and causal leverage. We find that a more “pro-regulation” electorate and elected chief regulators acting in close proximity to elections are associated with pro-consumer regulatory action.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)88-101
Number of pages14
JournalPolitical Research Quarterly
Volume71
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2018

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politics
election
industry
natural disaster
incentive
threat
regulation
responsibility
costs

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

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How the Unorganized Mass Public (Sometimes) Gets Represented in Regulatory Politics. / Miller, Susan M.; Witko, Christopher; Woods, Neal D.

In: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 71, No. 1, 01.03.2018, p. 88-101.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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