Impact of a non-linear pay-off function on pairwise stable collaborative oligopolies

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We extend the results of Goyal and Joshi (S. Goyal and S. Joshi. Networks of collaboration in oligopoly. Games and Economic behavior, 43(1):57-85, 2003), who first considered the problem of collaboration networks of oligopolies and showed that under certain linear assumptions network collaboration produced a stable complete graph through selfish competition. We show with nonlinear cost functions and player payoff alteration that stable collaboration graphs with an arbitrary degree sequence can result. We also show a generalized non-linear extension for the result in the aforementioned paper in which the complete graph is stable. An example is provided in which the complete set of pairwise stable collaborations is computed for an oligopoly consisting of five firms.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - SocialCom/PASSAT/BigData/EconCom/BioMedCom 2013
Pages750-755
Number of pages6
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2013
Event2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on Social Computing, SocialCom 2013, the 2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on Big Data, BigData 2013, the 2013 Int. Conf. on Economic Computing, EconCom 2013, the 2013 PASSAT 2013, and the 2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on BioMedCom 2013 - Washington, DC, United States
Duration: Sep 8 2013Sep 14 2013

Publication series

NameProceedings - SocialCom/PASSAT/BigData/EconCom/BioMedCom 2013

Other

Other2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on Social Computing, SocialCom 2013, the 2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on Big Data, BigData 2013, the 2013 Int. Conf. on Economic Computing, EconCom 2013, the 2013 PASSAT 2013, and the 2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on BioMedCom 2013
CountryUnited States
CityWashington, DC
Period9/8/139/14/13

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software

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    Lichter, S., Friesz, T., & Griffin, C. (2013). Impact of a non-linear pay-off function on pairwise stable collaborative oligopolies. In Proceedings - SocialCom/PASSAT/BigData/EconCom/BioMedCom 2013 (pp. 750-755). [6693409] (Proceedings - SocialCom/PASSAT/BigData/EconCom/BioMedCom 2013). https://doi.org/10.1109/SocialCom.2013.112