### Abstract

We extend the results of Goyal and Joshi (S. Goyal and S. Joshi. Networks of collaboration in oligopoly. Games and Economic behavior, 43(1):57-85, 2003), who first considered the problem of collaboration networks of oligopolies and showed that under certain linear assumptions network collaboration produced a stable complete graph through selfish competition. We show with nonlinear cost functions and player payoff alteration that stable collaboration graphs with an arbitrary degree sequence can result. We also show a generalized non-linear extension for the result in the aforementioned paper in which the complete graph is stable. An example is provided in which the complete set of pairwise stable collaborations is computed for an oligopoly consisting of five firms.

Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | Proceedings - SocialCom/PASSAT/BigData/EconCom/BioMedCom 2013 |

Pages | 750-755 |

Number of pages | 6 |

DOIs | |

State | Published - Dec 1 2013 |

Event | 2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on Social Computing, SocialCom 2013, the 2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on Big Data, BigData 2013, the 2013 Int. Conf. on Economic Computing, EconCom 2013, the 2013 PASSAT 2013, and the 2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on BioMedCom 2013 - Washington, DC, United States Duration: Sep 8 2013 → Sep 14 2013 |

### Publication series

Name | Proceedings - SocialCom/PASSAT/BigData/EconCom/BioMedCom 2013 |
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### Other

Other | 2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on Social Computing, SocialCom 2013, the 2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on Big Data, BigData 2013, the 2013 Int. Conf. on Economic Computing, EconCom 2013, the 2013 PASSAT 2013, and the 2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on BioMedCom 2013 |
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Country | United States |

City | Washington, DC |

Period | 9/8/13 → 9/14/13 |

### Fingerprint

### All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

- Software

### Cite this

*Proceedings - SocialCom/PASSAT/BigData/EconCom/BioMedCom 2013*(pp. 750-755). [6693409] (Proceedings - SocialCom/PASSAT/BigData/EconCom/BioMedCom 2013). https://doi.org/10.1109/SocialCom.2013.112

}

*Proceedings - SocialCom/PASSAT/BigData/EconCom/BioMedCom 2013.*, 6693409, Proceedings - SocialCom/PASSAT/BigData/EconCom/BioMedCom 2013, pp. 750-755, 2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on Social Computing, SocialCom 2013, the 2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on Big Data, BigData 2013, the 2013 Int. Conf. on Economic Computing, EconCom 2013, the 2013 PASSAT 2013, and the 2013 ASE/IEEE Int. Conf. on BioMedCom 2013, Washington, DC, United States, 9/8/13. https://doi.org/10.1109/SocialCom.2013.112

**Impact of a non-linear pay-off function on pairwise stable collaborative oligopolies.** / Lichter, Shaun; Friesz, Terry Lee; Griffin, Christopher.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

TY - GEN

T1 - Impact of a non-linear pay-off function on pairwise stable collaborative oligopolies

AU - Lichter, Shaun

AU - Friesz, Terry Lee

AU - Griffin, Christopher

PY - 2013/12/1

Y1 - 2013/12/1

N2 - We extend the results of Goyal and Joshi (S. Goyal and S. Joshi. Networks of collaboration in oligopoly. Games and Economic behavior, 43(1):57-85, 2003), who first considered the problem of collaboration networks of oligopolies and showed that under certain linear assumptions network collaboration produced a stable complete graph through selfish competition. We show with nonlinear cost functions and player payoff alteration that stable collaboration graphs with an arbitrary degree sequence can result. We also show a generalized non-linear extension for the result in the aforementioned paper in which the complete graph is stable. An example is provided in which the complete set of pairwise stable collaborations is computed for an oligopoly consisting of five firms.

AB - We extend the results of Goyal and Joshi (S. Goyal and S. Joshi. Networks of collaboration in oligopoly. Games and Economic behavior, 43(1):57-85, 2003), who first considered the problem of collaboration networks of oligopolies and showed that under certain linear assumptions network collaboration produced a stable complete graph through selfish competition. We show with nonlinear cost functions and player payoff alteration that stable collaboration graphs with an arbitrary degree sequence can result. We also show a generalized non-linear extension for the result in the aforementioned paper in which the complete graph is stable. An example is provided in which the complete set of pairwise stable collaborations is computed for an oligopoly consisting of five firms.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84893519780&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84893519780&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/SocialCom.2013.112

DO - 10.1109/SocialCom.2013.112

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 9780769551371

T3 - Proceedings - SocialCom/PASSAT/BigData/EconCom/BioMedCom 2013

SP - 750

EP - 755

BT - Proceedings - SocialCom/PASSAT/BigData/EconCom/BioMedCom 2013

ER -