In defense of adaptive preferences

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

41 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

An adaptive preference is a preference that is regimented in response to an agent's set of feasible options. The fabled fox in the sour grapes story undergoes an adaptive preference change. I consider adaptive preferences more broadly, to include adaptive preference formation as well. I argue that many adaptive preferences that other philosophers have cast out as irrational sour-grapes-like preferences are actually fully rational preferences worthy of pursuit. I offer a means of distinguishing rational and worthy adaptive preferences from irrational and unworthy ones. The distinction is based on the agent's own appraisal of the adaptive preference.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)307-324
Number of pages18
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume142
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1 2009

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Pursuit
Preference Change
Philosopher

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy

Cite this

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In defense of adaptive preferences. / Bruckner, Donald W.

In: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 142, No. 3, 01.02.2009, p. 307-324.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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