Incentivizing Signal and Energy Cooperation in Wireless Networks

Burak Varan, Aylin Yener

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    19 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We consider a two-hop wireless network where the source(s) in the network have the ability to wirelessly power the relay(s) who also have their own data to send to the destination. Considering the fact that each node in the network aims to maximize its own metric, we adopt a game theoretic approach that foresees offering relaying of the sources' data in exchange for energy provided to the relays, and simultaneously offering energy to the relays in exchange for their relaying services. We first study a Stackelberg competition with the single relay node as the leader, and investigate the impact of having multiple source nodes in the system. We next study the reciprocal Stackelberg game with the single source as the leader, and investigate the inter-relay competition with multiple relays. We find that in the Stackelberg games, the leader can improve its individual utility by influencing the follower's decision accordingly, even more so when there are multiple followers. We next formulate a noncooperative game between the source and the relay and show the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium by an appropriate pricing mechanism. The equilibrium maximizes the total utility of the network and allows the destination to choose how much data to receive from each node.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Article number7274650
    Pages (from-to)2554-2566
    Number of pages13
    JournalIEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
    Volume33
    Issue number12
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Dec 1 2015

    Fingerprint

    Wireless networks
    Costs

    All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

    • Computer Networks and Communications
    • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

    Cite this

    @article{458d8deb9db64d148911d50b8b066e12,
    title = "Incentivizing Signal and Energy Cooperation in Wireless Networks",
    abstract = "We consider a two-hop wireless network where the source(s) in the network have the ability to wirelessly power the relay(s) who also have their own data to send to the destination. Considering the fact that each node in the network aims to maximize its own metric, we adopt a game theoretic approach that foresees offering relaying of the sources' data in exchange for energy provided to the relays, and simultaneously offering energy to the relays in exchange for their relaying services. We first study a Stackelberg competition with the single relay node as the leader, and investigate the impact of having multiple source nodes in the system. We next study the reciprocal Stackelberg game with the single source as the leader, and investigate the inter-relay competition with multiple relays. We find that in the Stackelberg games, the leader can improve its individual utility by influencing the follower's decision accordingly, even more so when there are multiple followers. We next formulate a noncooperative game between the source and the relay and show the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium by an appropriate pricing mechanism. The equilibrium maximizes the total utility of the network and allows the destination to choose how much data to receive from each node.",
    author = "Burak Varan and Aylin Yener",
    year = "2015",
    month = "12",
    day = "1",
    doi = "10.1109/JSAC.2015.2481279",
    language = "English (US)",
    volume = "33",
    pages = "2554--2566",
    journal = "IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications",
    issn = "0733-8716",
    publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",
    number = "12",

    }

    Incentivizing Signal and Energy Cooperation in Wireless Networks. / Varan, Burak; Yener, Aylin.

    In: IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, Vol. 33, No. 12, 7274650, 01.12.2015, p. 2554-2566.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Incentivizing Signal and Energy Cooperation in Wireless Networks

    AU - Varan, Burak

    AU - Yener, Aylin

    PY - 2015/12/1

    Y1 - 2015/12/1

    N2 - We consider a two-hop wireless network where the source(s) in the network have the ability to wirelessly power the relay(s) who also have their own data to send to the destination. Considering the fact that each node in the network aims to maximize its own metric, we adopt a game theoretic approach that foresees offering relaying of the sources' data in exchange for energy provided to the relays, and simultaneously offering energy to the relays in exchange for their relaying services. We first study a Stackelberg competition with the single relay node as the leader, and investigate the impact of having multiple source nodes in the system. We next study the reciprocal Stackelberg game with the single source as the leader, and investigate the inter-relay competition with multiple relays. We find that in the Stackelberg games, the leader can improve its individual utility by influencing the follower's decision accordingly, even more so when there are multiple followers. We next formulate a noncooperative game between the source and the relay and show the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium by an appropriate pricing mechanism. The equilibrium maximizes the total utility of the network and allows the destination to choose how much data to receive from each node.

    AB - We consider a two-hop wireless network where the source(s) in the network have the ability to wirelessly power the relay(s) who also have their own data to send to the destination. Considering the fact that each node in the network aims to maximize its own metric, we adopt a game theoretic approach that foresees offering relaying of the sources' data in exchange for energy provided to the relays, and simultaneously offering energy to the relays in exchange for their relaying services. We first study a Stackelberg competition with the single relay node as the leader, and investigate the impact of having multiple source nodes in the system. We next study the reciprocal Stackelberg game with the single source as the leader, and investigate the inter-relay competition with multiple relays. We find that in the Stackelberg games, the leader can improve its individual utility by influencing the follower's decision accordingly, even more so when there are multiple followers. We next formulate a noncooperative game between the source and the relay and show the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium by an appropriate pricing mechanism. The equilibrium maximizes the total utility of the network and allows the destination to choose how much data to receive from each node.

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84960407796&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84960407796&partnerID=8YFLogxK

    U2 - 10.1109/JSAC.2015.2481279

    DO - 10.1109/JSAC.2015.2481279

    M3 - Article

    AN - SCOPUS:84960407796

    VL - 33

    SP - 2554

    EP - 2566

    JO - IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications

    JF - IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications

    SN - 0733-8716

    IS - 12

    M1 - 7274650

    ER -