TY - JOUR
T1 - Incomplete Record-Keeping and Optimal Payment Arrangements
AU - Kocherlakota, Narayana
AU - Wallace, Neil
PY - 1998/8
Y1 - 1998/8
N2 - We study a random-matching, absence-of-double-coincidence environment in which people cannot precommit and in which there are two imperfect ways to keep track of what other people have done in the past: money and a public record of all past actions that is updated with an average lag. We study how the magnitude of that lag affects the allocations that are optimal from among allocations that are stationary and feasible and that satisfy incentive constraints which arise from the absence of commitment and the imperfect ways of keeping track of what others have done in the past.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: E40; C73; D82.
AB - We study a random-matching, absence-of-double-coincidence environment in which people cannot precommit and in which there are two imperfect ways to keep track of what other people have done in the past: money and a public record of all past actions that is updated with an average lag. We study how the magnitude of that lag affects the allocations that are optimal from among allocations that are stationary and feasible and that satisfy incentive constraints which arise from the absence of commitment and the imperfect ways of keeping track of what others have done in the past.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: E40; C73; D82.
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U2 - 10.1006/jeth.1998.2396
DO - 10.1006/jeth.1998.2396
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0009958777
VL - 81
SP - 272
EP - 289
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
SN - 0022-0531
IS - 2
ER -