TY - JOUR
T1 - Influence and the Administrative Process
T2 - Lobbying the U.S. President's Office of Management and Budget
AU - Haeder, Simon F.
AU - Yackee, Susan Webb
N1 - Funding Information:
Susan Yackee would like to acknowledge the support of the Burroughs Wellcome Fund. The article also benefited from feedback by colleagues at Duke Law School, Indiana University's SPEA, Stanford University, and Nazarbayev University, as well as the 2014 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference. 29 06 2015 08 2015 109 3 507 522 Copyright © American Political Science Association 2015 2015 American Political Science Association
Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 American Political Science Association.
PY - 2015/8/7
Y1 - 2015/8/7
N2 - All administrative processes contain points of entry for politics, and the U.S. president's use of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to review government regulations is no exception. Specifically, OMB review can open up a pathway for interest groups to lobby for policy change. We theorize that interest group lobbying can be influential during OMB review, especially when there is consensus across groups. We use a selection model to test our argument with more than 1,500 regulations written by federal agencies that were subjected to OMB review. We find that lobbying is associated with change during OMB review. We also demonstrate that, when only business groups lobby, we are more likely to see rule change; however, the same is not true for public interest groups. We supplement these results with illustrative examples suggesting that interest groups can, at times, use OMB review to influence the content of legally binding government regulations.
AB - All administrative processes contain points of entry for politics, and the U.S. president's use of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to review government regulations is no exception. Specifically, OMB review can open up a pathway for interest groups to lobby for policy change. We theorize that interest group lobbying can be influential during OMB review, especially when there is consensus across groups. We use a selection model to test our argument with more than 1,500 regulations written by federal agencies that were subjected to OMB review. We find that lobbying is associated with change during OMB review. We also demonstrate that, when only business groups lobby, we are more likely to see rule change; however, the same is not true for public interest groups. We supplement these results with illustrative examples suggesting that interest groups can, at times, use OMB review to influence the content of legally binding government regulations.
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U2 - 10.1017/S0003055415000246
DO - 10.1017/S0003055415000246
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84938975522
SN - 0003-0554
VL - 109
SP - 507
EP - 522
JO - American Political Science Review
JF - American Political Science Review
IS - 3
ER -