Information Asymmetry, Regulations and Equilibrium Outcomes

Theory and Evidence from the Housing Rental Market

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We explore the role of information asymmetry and regulations on equilibrium outcomes in rental markets to show that while landlords price the cost of regulations into rent, they also invest in tenant screening to alleviate information asymmetry, thus restricting access to rental housing. We are the first to document this additional tenant screening in response to regulations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalReal Estate Economics
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Jan 1 2018

Fingerprint

Information asymmetry
Rental market
Screening
Rental housing
Costs
Asymmetry of information
Rent

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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title = "Information Asymmetry, Regulations and Equilibrium Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Housing Rental Market",
abstract = "We explore the role of information asymmetry and regulations on equilibrium outcomes in rental markets to show that while landlords price the cost of regulations into rent, they also invest in tenant screening to alleviate information asymmetry, thus restricting access to rental housing. We are the first to document this additional tenant screening in response to regulations.",
author = "Ambrose, {Brent William} and Moussa Diop",
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