Institution design and public good provision: an experimental study of the vote of confidence procedure

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Abstract

Parliamentary democracies use the vote of confidence procedure, which links the survival of a government with that of a bill, in order to discipline members of the majority. In this paper I investigate the role that the vote of confidence procedure has on public good provision and show that it has unintended negative consequences: even when efficient, public goods may be turned down in favor of earmarked projects. I use a laboratory experiment to test my model and show that the increase in voting cohesion comes at the cost of a 23 % reduction in public good provision and more unequal earmarking.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)697-717
Number of pages21
JournalExperimental Economics
Volume18
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2015

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)

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