Institution design and public good provision

an experimental study of the vote of confidence procedure

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Parliamentary democracies use the vote of confidence procedure, which links the survival of a government with that of a bill, in order to discipline members of the majority. In this paper I investigate the role that the vote of confidence procedure has on public good provision and show that it has unintended negative consequences: even when efficient, public goods may be turned down in favor of earmarked projects. I use a laboratory experiment to test my model and show that the increase in voting cohesion comes at the cost of a 23 % reduction in public good provision and more unequal earmarking.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)697-717
Number of pages21
JournalExperimental Economics
Volume18
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2015

Fingerprint

Confidence
Vote
Experimental study
Laboratory experiments
Government
Democracy
Cohesion
Voting

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)

Cite this

@article{d94f3ee611db41d6956ee55545887c6c,
title = "Institution design and public good provision: an experimental study of the vote of confidence procedure",
abstract = "Parliamentary democracies use the vote of confidence procedure, which links the survival of a government with that of a bill, in order to discipline members of the majority. In this paper I investigate the role that the vote of confidence procedure has on public good provision and show that it has unintended negative consequences: even when efficient, public goods may be turned down in favor of earmarked projects. I use a laboratory experiment to test my model and show that the increase in voting cohesion comes at the cost of a 23 {\%} reduction in public good provision and more unequal earmarking.",
author = "Tergiman, {Chloe Jeanne}",
year = "2015",
month = "12",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/s10683-014-9423-y",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "18",
pages = "697--717",
journal = "Experimental Economics",
issn = "1386-4157",
publisher = "Springer New York",
number = "4",

}

Institution design and public good provision : an experimental study of the vote of confidence procedure. / Tergiman, Chloe Jeanne.

In: Experimental Economics, Vol. 18, No. 4, 01.12.2015, p. 697-717.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Institution design and public good provision

T2 - an experimental study of the vote of confidence procedure

AU - Tergiman, Chloe Jeanne

PY - 2015/12/1

Y1 - 2015/12/1

N2 - Parliamentary democracies use the vote of confidence procedure, which links the survival of a government with that of a bill, in order to discipline members of the majority. In this paper I investigate the role that the vote of confidence procedure has on public good provision and show that it has unintended negative consequences: even when efficient, public goods may be turned down in favor of earmarked projects. I use a laboratory experiment to test my model and show that the increase in voting cohesion comes at the cost of a 23 % reduction in public good provision and more unequal earmarking.

AB - Parliamentary democracies use the vote of confidence procedure, which links the survival of a government with that of a bill, in order to discipline members of the majority. In this paper I investigate the role that the vote of confidence procedure has on public good provision and show that it has unintended negative consequences: even when efficient, public goods may be turned down in favor of earmarked projects. I use a laboratory experiment to test my model and show that the increase in voting cohesion comes at the cost of a 23 % reduction in public good provision and more unequal earmarking.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84946095897&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84946095897&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s10683-014-9423-y

DO - 10.1007/s10683-014-9423-y

M3 - Article

VL - 18

SP - 697

EP - 717

JO - Experimental Economics

JF - Experimental Economics

SN - 1386-4157

IS - 4

ER -