Abstract
Parliamentary democracies use the vote of confidence procedure, which links the survival of a government with that of a bill, in order to discipline members of the majority. In this paper I investigate the role that the vote of confidence procedure has on public good provision and show that it has unintended negative consequences: even when efficient, public goods may be turned down in favor of earmarked projects. I use a laboratory experiment to test my model and show that the increase in voting cohesion comes at the cost of a 23 % reduction in public good provision and more unequal earmarking.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 697-717 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | Experimental Economics |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Dec 1 2015 |
Fingerprint
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
Cite this
}
Institution design and public good provision : an experimental study of the vote of confidence procedure. / Tergiman, Chloe.
In: Experimental Economics, Vol. 18, No. 4, 01.12.2015, p. 697-717.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Institution design and public good provision
T2 - an experimental study of the vote of confidence procedure
AU - Tergiman, Chloe
PY - 2015/12/1
Y1 - 2015/12/1
N2 - Parliamentary democracies use the vote of confidence procedure, which links the survival of a government with that of a bill, in order to discipline members of the majority. In this paper I investigate the role that the vote of confidence procedure has on public good provision and show that it has unintended negative consequences: even when efficient, public goods may be turned down in favor of earmarked projects. I use a laboratory experiment to test my model and show that the increase in voting cohesion comes at the cost of a 23 % reduction in public good provision and more unequal earmarking.
AB - Parliamentary democracies use the vote of confidence procedure, which links the survival of a government with that of a bill, in order to discipline members of the majority. In this paper I investigate the role that the vote of confidence procedure has on public good provision and show that it has unintended negative consequences: even when efficient, public goods may be turned down in favor of earmarked projects. I use a laboratory experiment to test my model and show that the increase in voting cohesion comes at the cost of a 23 % reduction in public good provision and more unequal earmarking.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84946095897&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84946095897&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s10683-014-9423-y
DO - 10.1007/s10683-014-9423-y
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84946095897
VL - 18
SP - 697
EP - 717
JO - Experimental Economics
JF - Experimental Economics
SN - 1386-4157
IS - 4
ER -