Insurance and Endogenous Bankruptcy Risk: When is it Rational to Choose Gambling, Insurance, and Potential Bankruptcy?

Lisa Lipowski Posey, Vickie Bajtelsmit

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We examine the coexistence of insurance and gambling in the context of limited liability. We develop a model where actuarially fair insurance is available to a risk-averse decision maker for a liability risk with non-bankrupting severity. The remaining wealth may be invested in a zero expected value risky project (i.e., gambled). The risk of bankruptcy is endogenous since either fully insuring or forgoing the project will guarantee solvency. We show that, for a range of parameters, it is optimal to both insure and gamble. The amounts insured and invested are chosen to create the potential for bankruptcy. Our results are robust to the cases where the risky project can cause bankruptcy without a liability loss and where the risky project's expected return is nonzero.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)15-40
Number of pages26
JournalGENEVA Risk and Insurance Review
Volume42
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2017

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Gambling
Bankruptcy
Insurance
Liability
Decision maker
Expected value
Risk-averse
Limited liability
Expected returns
Wealth
Guarantee
Severity
Solvency
Gambles
Coexistence

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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Insurance and Endogenous Bankruptcy Risk : When is it Rational to Choose Gambling, Insurance, and Potential Bankruptcy? / Posey, Lisa Lipowski; Bajtelsmit, Vickie.

In: GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review, Vol. 42, No. 1, 01.03.2017, p. 15-40.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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