Insurance fraud and optimal claims settlement strategies

Keith John Crocker, Sharon Tennyson

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

44 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We examine the optimal claims settlement strategy for a liability insurer when claimants can permanently misrepresent their losses by engaging in costly claims falsification. In this environment, claims auditing is not a possible deterrent to fraud, and the settlement strategy consists of an indemnification profile that relates the insurance payment to the claimed amount of loss. The optimal indemnification profile is shown to involve systematic underpayment of claims at the margin as a means to deter loss exaggeration, with the extent of underpayment limited by expected litigation costs and potential bad-faith claims. The key testable implication of the theory is that the extent of underpayment should be greater for classes of claims for which loss exaggeration is easier. Empirical analysis of insurance settlements for bodily injury liability in automobile accidents confirms this prediction. This suggests that liability insurers optimally choose claims payment strategies to lessen a claimant's incentive to exaggerate losses.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)469-507
Number of pages39
JournalJournal of Law and Economics
Volume45
Issue number2 I
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2002

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fraud
liability
insurance
falsification
auditing
motor vehicle
faith
accident
incentive
costs
Insurance fraud
Liability
Payment
Insurance
Insurer

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Law

Cite this

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Insurance fraud and optimal claims settlement strategies. / Crocker, Keith John; Tennyson, Sharon.

In: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 45, No. 2 I, 01.01.2002, p. 469-507.

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

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