Interindividual-intergroup discontinuity as a function of trust and categorization: The paradox of expected cooperation

Chester A. Insko, Jeffrey L. Kirchner, Jamie Efaw, Brad Pinter, Tim Wildschut

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

56 Scopus citations

Abstract

Two experiments used a 3-choice variation of the prisoner's dilemma game to explore the paradoxical implications of expected cooperation of other groups and individuals for competitiveness and cooperativeness. Experiment 1 found that an experimental manipulation of opponent trustworthiness influenced the tendency of both groups and individuals to cooperate but had no significant effect on the tendency of groups and individuals to compete - possibly because of the perceived unfairness of competing with a trustworthy other. Experiment 2 found that an experimental manipulation of categorization increased the tendency of same-category groups and individuals to cooperate (as in Experiment 1) and also increased the tendency of same-category groups, but not individuals, to compete (unlike in Experiment 1). It was further found that the tendency of same-category groups to compete more than same-category individuals was relatively stronger for participants high in guilt proneness.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)365-385
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Personality and Social Psychology
Volume88
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2005

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Social Psychology
  • Sociology and Political Science

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