Abstract
Sensor networks are often deployed in unattended environments, thus leaving these networks vulnerable to false data injection attacks in which an adversary injects false data into the network with the goal of deceiving the base station or depleting the resources of the relaying nodes. Standard authentication mechanisms cannot prevent this attack if the adversary has compromised one or a small number of sensor nodes. We present three interleaved hop-by-hop authentication schemes that guarantee that the base station can detect injected false data immediately when no more than t nodes are compromised, where t is a system design parameter. Moreover, these schemes enable an intermediate forwarding node to detect and discard false data packets as early as possible. Our performance analysis shows that our scheme is efficient with respect to the security it provides, and it also allows a tradeoff between security and performance. A prototype implementation of our scheme indicates that our scheme is practical and can be deployed on the current generation of sensor nodes.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Article number | 1267062 |
| Journal | ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks |
| Volume | 3 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Aug 1 2007 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Computer Networks and Communications
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Interleaved hop-by-hop authentication against false data injection attacks in sensor networks. / Zhu, Sencun; Setia, Sanjeev; Jajodia, Sushil; Ning, Peng.
In: ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1267062, 01.08.2007.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Interleaved hop-by-hop authentication against false data injection attacks in sensor networks
AU - Zhu, Sencun
AU - Setia, Sanjeev
AU - Jajodia, Sushil
AU - Ning, Peng
PY - 2007/8/1
Y1 - 2007/8/1
N2 - Sensor networks are often deployed in unattended environments, thus leaving these networks vulnerable to false data injection attacks in which an adversary injects false data into the network with the goal of deceiving the base station or depleting the resources of the relaying nodes. Standard authentication mechanisms cannot prevent this attack if the adversary has compromised one or a small number of sensor nodes. We present three interleaved hop-by-hop authentication schemes that guarantee that the base station can detect injected false data immediately when no more than t nodes are compromised, where t is a system design parameter. Moreover, these schemes enable an intermediate forwarding node to detect and discard false data packets as early as possible. Our performance analysis shows that our scheme is efficient with respect to the security it provides, and it also allows a tradeoff between security and performance. A prototype implementation of our scheme indicates that our scheme is practical and can be deployed on the current generation of sensor nodes.
AB - Sensor networks are often deployed in unattended environments, thus leaving these networks vulnerable to false data injection attacks in which an adversary injects false data into the network with the goal of deceiving the base station or depleting the resources of the relaying nodes. Standard authentication mechanisms cannot prevent this attack if the adversary has compromised one or a small number of sensor nodes. We present three interleaved hop-by-hop authentication schemes that guarantee that the base station can detect injected false data immediately when no more than t nodes are compromised, where t is a system design parameter. Moreover, these schemes enable an intermediate forwarding node to detect and discard false data packets as early as possible. Our performance analysis shows that our scheme is efficient with respect to the security it provides, and it also allows a tradeoff between security and performance. A prototype implementation of our scheme indicates that our scheme is practical and can be deployed on the current generation of sensor nodes.
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U2 - 10.1145/1267060.1267062
DO - 10.1145/1267060.1267062
M3 - Article
VL - 3
JO - ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks
JF - ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks
SN - 1550-4859
IS - 3
M1 - 1267062
ER -