Investigating the characteristics of one-sided matching mechanisms

Hadi Hosseini, Kate Larson, Robin Cohen

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    1 Scopus citations

    Abstract

    For one-sided matching problems, two widely studied mechanisms are the Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) and the Probabilistic Serial Rule (PS). The induced outcomes of these two mechanisms are often incomparable and thus there are challenges when it comes to deciding which mechanism to adopt in practice. Working in the space of general preferences, we provide empirical results on the (in)comparability of RSD and PS and analyze their economic properties.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationAAMAS 2016 - Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
    PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
    Pages1443-1444
    Number of pages2
    ISBN (Electronic)9781450342391
    StatePublished - 2016
    Event15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016 - Singapore, Singapore
    Duration: May 9 2016May 13 2016

    Publication series

    NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
    ISSN (Print)1548-8403
    ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

    Other

    Other15th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2016
    CountrySingapore
    CitySingapore
    Period5/9/165/13/16

    All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

    • Artificial Intelligence
    • Software
    • Control and Systems Engineering

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