Jeopardy, non-public information, and insider trading around SEC 10-K and 10-Q filings

Steven Huddart, Bin Ke, Charles Shi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

95 Scopus citations

Abstract

Evidence contrasting U.S. insider trades in high- and low-jeopardy periods and across firms at high and low risk for 10b-5 litigation indicates that insiders condition their trades on foreknowledge of price-relevant public disclosures, but avoid profitable trades when the jeopardy associated with such trades is high, such as immediately before earnings announcements. Insiders avoid profitable trades before quarterly earnings are announced and sell (buy) after good (bad) news earnings announcements. Insiders trade most heavily after earnings announcements and profit from foreknowledge of price-relevant information in the forthcoming Form 10-K or 10-Q filing.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)3-36
Number of pages34
JournalJournal of Accounting and Economics
Volume43
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2007

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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