Justifying integrity using a virtual machine verifier

Joshua Schiffman, Thomas Moyer, Christopher Shal, Trent Jaeger, Patrick McDaniel

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

19 Scopus citations

Abstract

Emerging distributed computing architectures, such as grid and cloud computing, depend on the high integrity execution of each system in the computation. While integrity measurement enables systems to generate proofs of their integrity to remote parties, we find that current integrity measurement approaches are insufficient to prove runtime integrity for systems in these architectures. Integrity measurement approaches that are flexible enough have an incomplete view of runtime integrity, possibly leading to false integrity claims, and approaches that provide comprehensive integrity do so only for computing environments that are too restrictive. In this paper, we propose an architecture for building comprehensive runtime integrity proofs for general purpose systems in distributed computing architectures. In this architecture, we strive for classical integrity, using an approximation of the Clark-Wilson integrity model as our target. Key to building such integrity proofs is a carefully crafted host system whose long-term integrity can be justified easily using current techniques and a new component, called a VM verifier, which comprehensively enforces our integrity target on VMs. We have built a prototype based on the Xen virtual machine system for SELinux VMs, and find that distributed compilation can be implemented, providing accurate proofs of our integrity target with less than 4% overhead.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication25th Annual Computer Conference Security Applications, ACSAC 2009
Pages83-92
Number of pages10
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2009
Event25th Annual Computer Conference Security Applications, ACSAC 2009 - Honolulu, HI, United States
Duration: Dec 7 2009Dec 11 2009

Publication series

NameProceedings - Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC
ISSN (Print)1063-9527

Other

Other25th Annual Computer Conference Security Applications, ACSAC 2009
CountryUnited States
CityHonolulu, HI
Period12/7/0912/11/09

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Software
  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Justifying integrity using a virtual machine verifier'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this

    Schiffman, J., Moyer, T., Shal, C., Jaeger, T., & McDaniel, P. (2009). Justifying integrity using a virtual machine verifier. In 25th Annual Computer Conference Security Applications, ACSAC 2009 (pp. 83-92). [5380521] (Proceedings - Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC). https://doi.org/10.1109/ACSAC.2009.18