Keeping the Schools Open While the Troops are Away: Regime Type, Interstate War, and Government Spending

Jeff Carter, Glenn Palmer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

How and why do regime type and interstate war affect government spending? We argue that a political leader allocates scarce resources between social and military expenditures as a function of their relative efficiency in securing her political survival. We derive four hypotheses concerning how mobilization for and demobilization from interstate war affects government spending differently in democratic and autocratic regimes. Compared to democracies, autocracies should increase military spending to a greater degree during wartime and decrease military spending to a greater extent following a war. Autocracies also should cut social spending more during an interstate war and increase social spending more during the process of demobilization from war than democracies. Our analyses of all states in the international system from 1950 to 2001 yield support for our hypotheses.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)145-157
Number of pages13
JournalInternational Studies Quarterly
Volume59
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2015

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regime
demobilization
school
Military
democracy
international system
mobilization
expenditures
leader
efficiency
resources

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

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Keeping the Schools Open While the Troops are Away : Regime Type, Interstate War, and Government Spending. / Carter, Jeff; Palmer, Glenn.

In: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 59, No. 1, 01.03.2015, p. 145-157.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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