Kepler: Facilitating control-flow hijacking primitive evaluation for linux kernel vulnerabilities

Wei Wu, Yueqi Chen, Xinyu Xing, Wei Zou

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Automatic exploit generation is a challenging problem. A challenging part of the task is to connect an identified exploitable state (exploit primitive) to triggering execution of code-reuse (e.g., ROP) payload. A control-flow hijacking primitive is one of the most common capabilities for exploitation. However, due to the challenges of widely deployed exploit mitigations, pitfalls along an exploit path, and ill-suited primitives, it is difficult to even manually craft an exploit with a control-flow hijacking primitive for an off-the-shelf modern Linux kernel. We propose KEPLER to facilitate exploit generation by automatically generating a “single-shot” exploitation chain. KEPLER accepts as input a control-flow hijacking primitive and bootstraps any kernel ROP payload by symbolically stitching an exploitation chain taking advantage of prevalent kernel coding style and corresponding gadgets. Comparisons with previous automatic exploit generation techniques and previous kernel exploit techniques show KEPLER effectively facilitates evaluation of control-flow hijacking primitives in the Linux kernel.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium
PublisherUSENIX Association
Pages1187-1204
Number of pages18
ISBN (Electronic)9781939133069
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019
Event28th USENIX Security Symposium - Santa Clara, United States
Duration: Aug 14 2019Aug 16 2019

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium

Conference

Conference28th USENIX Security Symposium
CountryUnited States
CitySanta Clara
Period8/14/198/16/19

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Information Systems
  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

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  • Cite this

    Wu, W., Chen, Y., Xing, X., & Zou, W. (2019). Kepler: Facilitating control-flow hijacking primitive evaluation for linux kernel vulnerabilities. In Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium (pp. 1187-1204). (Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium). USENIX Association.