Large losses and equilibrium in insurance markets

Lisa Lipowski Posey, Paul D. Thistle

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We show that if losses are larger than wealth, then individuals with the option of declaring bankruptcy will not insure if the loss probability is above a threshold. In an insurance market with adverse selection, if the high risks’ loss probability is above the threshold, then no trade occurs at the Rothschild–Stiglitz equilibrium. Active trade in insurance requires cross-subsidization. When a subset of individuals with significant costs of bankruptcy and default is included in the market, then the equilibrium outcome always involves positive levels of insurance coverage for some individuals, but the parameters of the model determine whether all types receive coverage, or whether null contracts are received by both high and low risks with no bankruptcy costs or just the low risks from that group.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalGENEVA Risk and Insurance Review
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019

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Insurance market
Insurance
Bankruptcy
Cross-subsidization
Adverse selection
Costs
Bankruptcy costs
Wealth

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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Large losses and equilibrium in insurance markets. / Posey, Lisa Lipowski; Thistle, Paul D.

In: GENEVA Risk and Insurance Review, 01.01.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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