Legislative socialization and interbranch rivalry: Consequences of divided party government

L. Marvin Overby, Gary W. Copeland

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This article tests the hypothesis that members of Congress are socialized into certain attitudes concerning interbranch comity or rivalry early during their tenures in office. Specifically, utilizing a multivariate regression model, we test the claim made by several scholars and former presidents that members who initially serve in Congress under a president of the other party will be less likely than their colleagues to support subsequent presidents of their own party. Our findings provide little support for a "socialized to opposition" mentality and, in fact, indicate that members socialized under an opposition president are modestly more amenable to leadership from presidents of their own party.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)119-130
Number of pages12
JournalCongress and the Presidency
Volume20
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1993

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

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