Lending with costly enforcement of repayment and potential fraud

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

10 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

If penalizing a borrower in default is costly to lenders, Pareto-improving loans may be dynamically inconsistent not because there is no sufficiently harsh penalty for default, but because the lender has no incentive to implement the penalty if default occurs. Infinitely-lived institutions repeatedly intermediating between lenders and borrowers, called banks, can enforce contracts that individual lenders cannot, but to do so they must earn strictly positive profits. Maintaining the value of bank equity can also provide an incentive for bank owners not to use deposits fraudulently.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)281-293
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Banking and Finance
Volume10
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1986

Fingerprint

Fraud
Enforcement
Lending
Incentives
Penalty
Owners
Loans
Pareto
Deposits
Equity
Profit

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

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title = "Lending with costly enforcement of repayment and potential fraud",
abstract = "If penalizing a borrower in default is costly to lenders, Pareto-improving loans may be dynamically inconsistent not because there is no sufficiently harsh penalty for default, but because the lender has no incentive to implement the penalty if default occurs. Infinitely-lived institutions repeatedly intermediating between lenders and borrowers, called banks, can enforce contracts that individual lenders cannot, but to do so they must earn strictly positive profits. Maintaining the value of bank equity can also provide an incentive for bank owners not to use deposits fraudulently.",
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Lending with costly enforcement of repayment and potential fraud. / Eaton, Jonathan.

In: Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 10, No. 2, 06.1986, p. 281-293.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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