Making it personal: The role of leader-specific signals in extended deterrence

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This article explores how a major power’s leader can deter challenges against weaker states using “leader-specific” signals of support. These signals are sent by a leader personally and publicly, so that the leader becomes associated with the signal in the eyes of the public. Leader-specific signals can be a valuable tool for achieving credible extended deterrence because they are flexible, and they create personal audience and reputational costs for leaders. I focus on leader visits abroad as the type of leader-specific signal that is most likely to be credible. I use original data recording leadership visits in a statistical analysis of extended deterrence success 1950–2007 and find that these visits have a significant deterrent effect. This is particularly true when a visit is accompanied by a high level of supportive statements and when the visit recipient also has a major power defense pact.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)982-995
Number of pages14
JournalJournal of Politics
Volume80
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1 2018

Fingerprint

deterrence
leader
statistical analysis
recording
recipient
leadership
costs

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

@article{fe6aab17121d4b75be56faa4816eace9,
title = "Making it personal: The role of leader-specific signals in extended deterrence",
abstract = "This article explores how a major power’s leader can deter challenges against weaker states using “leader-specific” signals of support. These signals are sent by a leader personally and publicly, so that the leader becomes associated with the signal in the eyes of the public. Leader-specific signals can be a valuable tool for achieving credible extended deterrence because they are flexible, and they create personal audience and reputational costs for leaders. I focus on leader visits abroad as the type of leader-specific signal that is most likely to be credible. I use original data recording leadership visits in a statistical analysis of extended deterrence success 1950–2007 and find that these visits have a significant deterrent effect. This is particularly true when a visit is accompanied by a high level of supportive statements and when the visit recipient also has a major power defense pact.",
author = "McManus, {Roseanne W.}",
year = "2018",
month = "7",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1086/697462",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "80",
pages = "982--995",
journal = "Journal of Politics",
issn = "0022-3816",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
number = "3",

}

Making it personal : The role of leader-specific signals in extended deterrence. / McManus, Roseanne W.

In: Journal of Politics, Vol. 80, No. 3, 01.07.2018, p. 982-995.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Making it personal

T2 - The role of leader-specific signals in extended deterrence

AU - McManus, Roseanne W.

PY - 2018/7/1

Y1 - 2018/7/1

N2 - This article explores how a major power’s leader can deter challenges against weaker states using “leader-specific” signals of support. These signals are sent by a leader personally and publicly, so that the leader becomes associated with the signal in the eyes of the public. Leader-specific signals can be a valuable tool for achieving credible extended deterrence because they are flexible, and they create personal audience and reputational costs for leaders. I focus on leader visits abroad as the type of leader-specific signal that is most likely to be credible. I use original data recording leadership visits in a statistical analysis of extended deterrence success 1950–2007 and find that these visits have a significant deterrent effect. This is particularly true when a visit is accompanied by a high level of supportive statements and when the visit recipient also has a major power defense pact.

AB - This article explores how a major power’s leader can deter challenges against weaker states using “leader-specific” signals of support. These signals are sent by a leader personally and publicly, so that the leader becomes associated with the signal in the eyes of the public. Leader-specific signals can be a valuable tool for achieving credible extended deterrence because they are flexible, and they create personal audience and reputational costs for leaders. I focus on leader visits abroad as the type of leader-specific signal that is most likely to be credible. I use original data recording leadership visits in a statistical analysis of extended deterrence success 1950–2007 and find that these visits have a significant deterrent effect. This is particularly true when a visit is accompanied by a high level of supportive statements and when the visit recipient also has a major power defense pact.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85045833047&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85045833047&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1086/697462

DO - 10.1086/697462

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85045833047

VL - 80

SP - 982

EP - 995

JO - Journal of Politics

JF - Journal of Politics

SN - 0022-3816

IS - 3

ER -