Abstract
Attacker VMs try to co-reside with victim VMs on the same physical infrastructure as a precursor to launching attacks that target information leakage. VM migration is an effective countermeasure against attempts at malicious co-residency. In this paper, we first undertake an experimental study on Amazon EC2 to obtain an in-depth understanding of the side-channels an attacker can use to ascertain co-residency with a victim. Here, we identify a new set of stealthy side-channel attacks which, we show to be more effective than currently available attacks towards verifying co-residency. Based on the study, we develop a set of guidelines to determine under what conditions victim VM migrations should be triggered given performance costs in terms of bandwidth and downtime, that a user is willing to bear. Via extensive experiments on our private in-house cloud, we show that migrations using our guidelines can limit the fraction of the time that an attacker VM co-resides with a victim VM to about 1 % of the time with bandwidth costs of a few MB and downtimes of a few seconds, per day per VM migrated.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | INFOCOM 2017 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications |
| Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781509053360 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Oct 2 2017 |
| Event | 2017 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2017 - Atlanta, United States Duration: May 1 2017 → May 4 2017 |
Publication series
| Name | Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM |
|---|---|
| ISSN (Print) | 0743-166X |
Other
| Other | 2017 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2017 |
|---|---|
| Country | United States |
| City | Atlanta |
| Period | 5/1/17 → 5/4/17 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Computer Science(all)
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Cite this
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Malicious co-residency on the cloud : Attacks and defense. / Atya, Ahmed Osama Fathy; Qian, Zhiyun; Krishnamurthy, Srikanth V.; La Porta, Thomas F.; McDaniel, Patrick Drew; Marvel, Lisa.
INFOCOM 2017 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2017. 8056951 (Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
TY - GEN
T1 - Malicious co-residency on the cloud
T2 - Attacks and defense
AU - Atya, Ahmed Osama Fathy
AU - Qian, Zhiyun
AU - Krishnamurthy, Srikanth V.
AU - La Porta, Thomas F.
AU - McDaniel, Patrick Drew
AU - Marvel, Lisa
PY - 2017/10/2
Y1 - 2017/10/2
N2 - Attacker VMs try to co-reside with victim VMs on the same physical infrastructure as a precursor to launching attacks that target information leakage. VM migration is an effective countermeasure against attempts at malicious co-residency. In this paper, we first undertake an experimental study on Amazon EC2 to obtain an in-depth understanding of the side-channels an attacker can use to ascertain co-residency with a victim. Here, we identify a new set of stealthy side-channel attacks which, we show to be more effective than currently available attacks towards verifying co-residency. Based on the study, we develop a set of guidelines to determine under what conditions victim VM migrations should be triggered given performance costs in terms of bandwidth and downtime, that a user is willing to bear. Via extensive experiments on our private in-house cloud, we show that migrations using our guidelines can limit the fraction of the time that an attacker VM co-resides with a victim VM to about 1 % of the time with bandwidth costs of a few MB and downtimes of a few seconds, per day per VM migrated.
AB - Attacker VMs try to co-reside with victim VMs on the same physical infrastructure as a precursor to launching attacks that target information leakage. VM migration is an effective countermeasure against attempts at malicious co-residency. In this paper, we first undertake an experimental study on Amazon EC2 to obtain an in-depth understanding of the side-channels an attacker can use to ascertain co-residency with a victim. Here, we identify a new set of stealthy side-channel attacks which, we show to be more effective than currently available attacks towards verifying co-residency. Based on the study, we develop a set of guidelines to determine under what conditions victim VM migrations should be triggered given performance costs in terms of bandwidth and downtime, that a user is willing to bear. Via extensive experiments on our private in-house cloud, we show that migrations using our guidelines can limit the fraction of the time that an attacker VM co-resides with a victim VM to about 1 % of the time with bandwidth costs of a few MB and downtimes of a few seconds, per day per VM migrated.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85034090019&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85034090019&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/INFOCOM.2017.8056951
DO - 10.1109/INFOCOM.2017.8056951
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85034090019
T3 - Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
BT - INFOCOM 2017 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ER -