TY - GEN
T1 - Malicious co-residency on the cloud
T2 - 2017 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2017
AU - Atya, Ahmed Osama Fathy
AU - Qian, Zhiyun
AU - Krishnamurthy, Srikanth V.
AU - Porta, Thomas La
AU - McDaniel, Patrick
AU - Marvel, Lisa
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgment: : The effort described in this article was partially sponsored by the U.S. Army Research Laboratory Cyber Security Collaborative Research Alliance under Cooperative Agreement W911NF-13-2-0045. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors, and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Army Research Laboratory or the U.S. Government. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Government purposes, notwithstanding any copyright notation hereon.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 IEEE.
PY - 2017/10/2
Y1 - 2017/10/2
N2 - Attacker VMs try to co-reside with victim VMs on the same physical infrastructure as a precursor to launching attacks that target information leakage. VM migration is an effective countermeasure against attempts at malicious co-residency. In this paper, we first undertake an experimental study on Amazon EC2 to obtain an in-depth understanding of the side-channels an attacker can use to ascertain co-residency with a victim. Here, we identify a new set of stealthy side-channel attacks which, we show to be more effective than currently available attacks towards verifying co-residency. Based on the study, we develop a set of guidelines to determine under what conditions victim VM migrations should be triggered given performance costs in terms of bandwidth and downtime, that a user is willing to bear. Via extensive experiments on our private in-house cloud, we show that migrations using our guidelines can limit the fraction of the time that an attacker VM co-resides with a victim VM to about 1 % of the time with bandwidth costs of a few MB and downtimes of a few seconds, per day per VM migrated.
AB - Attacker VMs try to co-reside with victim VMs on the same physical infrastructure as a precursor to launching attacks that target information leakage. VM migration is an effective countermeasure against attempts at malicious co-residency. In this paper, we first undertake an experimental study on Amazon EC2 to obtain an in-depth understanding of the side-channels an attacker can use to ascertain co-residency with a victim. Here, we identify a new set of stealthy side-channel attacks which, we show to be more effective than currently available attacks towards verifying co-residency. Based on the study, we develop a set of guidelines to determine under what conditions victim VM migrations should be triggered given performance costs in terms of bandwidth and downtime, that a user is willing to bear. Via extensive experiments on our private in-house cloud, we show that migrations using our guidelines can limit the fraction of the time that an attacker VM co-resides with a victim VM to about 1 % of the time with bandwidth costs of a few MB and downtimes of a few seconds, per day per VM migrated.
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U2 - 10.1109/INFOCOM.2017.8056951
DO - 10.1109/INFOCOM.2017.8056951
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85034090019
T3 - Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
BT - INFOCOM 2017 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 1 May 2017 through 4 May 2017
ER -