Market Equilibrium for dispatchable transmission using FACT devices

M. Sahraei-Ardakani, Seth Adam Blumsack

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Traditionally system operators would minimize generation cost considering transmission as a passive system. Having the smart grid technology transmission network topology can be optimized simultaneously with the generation system. This can be done either by switching lines on and off, or by continuously controlling the admittance of the lines. FACTS devices make adjustment of a transmission line's admittance possible. Here we study a market design for operation of such FACTS devices based on Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE). We model the variable cost associated with utilization of the FACTS devices as the relative additional cost of losses. The owners are being paid the market clearing price for the additional transfer capacity they provide. The problem is formulated for a simple two-node two-transmission line system. It is shown that the marginal cost functions are increasing and it is not clear that FACTS devices are natural monopoly. Our simulation study shows that a market-mechanism can be employed for operation of the devices. Under the market mechanism that we consider, owners of FACTS devices are permitted make supply offers to the market alongside generators. Market-clearing consists of determining nodal prices for generators and admittance-based pricing for transmission or FACTS device owners. Such a market would be beneficial to the device owners by providing revenue for them and the system by increasing the social welfare.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2012 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PES 2012
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 11 2012
Event2012 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PES 2012 - San Diego, CA, United States
Duration: Jul 22 2012Jul 26 2012

Publication series

NameIEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting
ISSN (Print)1944-9925
ISSN (Electronic)1944-9933

Other

Other2012 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PES 2012
CountryUnited States
CitySan Diego, CA
Period7/22/127/26/12

Fingerprint

Costs
Electric lines
Electric power transmission networks
Cost functions
Flexible AC transmission systems
Topology

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Energy Engineering and Power Technology
  • Nuclear Energy and Engineering
  • Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Sahraei-Ardakani, M., & Blumsack, S. A. (2012). Market Equilibrium for dispatchable transmission using FACT devices. In 2012 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PES 2012 [6345693] (IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting). https://doi.org/10.1109/PESGM.2012.6345693
Sahraei-Ardakani, M. ; Blumsack, Seth Adam. / Market Equilibrium for dispatchable transmission using FACT devices. 2012 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PES 2012. 2012. (IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting).
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Sahraei-Ardakani, M & Blumsack, SA 2012, Market Equilibrium for dispatchable transmission using FACT devices. in 2012 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PES 2012., 6345693, IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, 2012 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PES 2012, San Diego, CA, United States, 7/22/12. https://doi.org/10.1109/PESGM.2012.6345693

Market Equilibrium for dispatchable transmission using FACT devices. / Sahraei-Ardakani, M.; Blumsack, Seth Adam.

2012 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PES 2012. 2012. 6345693 (IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Sahraei-Ardakani M, Blumsack SA. Market Equilibrium for dispatchable transmission using FACT devices. In 2012 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PES 2012. 2012. 6345693. (IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting). https://doi.org/10.1109/PESGM.2012.6345693