Matching and price competition: Beyond symmetric linear costs

Julio González-Díaz, Ron Siegel

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

Bulow and Levin's (2006) "Matching and Price Competition" studies a matching model in which hospitals compete for interns by offering wages. We relax the assumption of symmetric linear costs and compare the pricing equilibrium that results to the firm-optimal competitive equilibrium. With linear and asymmetric costs, competition in the pricing equilibrium may not be localized, but all other qualitative comparisons of Bulow and Levin (2006) hold. With non-linear and symmetric costs workers' average utility in the pricing equilibrium may be higher than in the firm- optimal competitive equilibrium. With asymmetric and non-linear costs, firms need not choose scores from an interval in a pricing equilibrium, which may make competition even less localized.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)835-844
Number of pages10
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume42
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1 2013

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Matching and price competition: Beyond symmetric linear costs'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this