Memory of time in the light of flesh

Charles Edward Scott

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

I wish to show that living is composed of events that are defined by memories, that memories are inclusive of what we might call animality, that memories are definitive of the occurrence of time, and that experiences of light and of animality are inseparably associated. Our ability to communicate with animals, our projections onto them, and our own experiences of animality show memories of something that is intrinsic to our lives and to events of appearance as well as something that Heidegger leaves out of his thought. Time belongs to memory in the sense that time happens with and in memories. Without memory time does not occur. Without time memory does not occur. The phrase, the memory of time, when one maximizes the ambiguity of the 'of', means that each belongs to the other and although we might find time passing through memory, we will also find memory marking time. The account suggests that the 'light' of appearing happens in a fleshly way that requires considerable modification of Heidegger's descriptive accounts of dasein and being.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)421-432
Number of pages12
JournalContinental Philosophy Review
Volume32
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1999

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Flesh
Animality
Martin Heidegger
Wishes
Thought
Appearings
Animals
Dasein
Descriptive
Intrinsic

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Scott, Charles Edward. / Memory of time in the light of flesh. In: Continental Philosophy Review. 1999 ; Vol. 32, No. 4. pp. 421-432.
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Memory of time in the light of flesh. / Scott, Charles Edward.

In: Continental Philosophy Review, Vol. 32, No. 4, 01.01.1999, p. 421-432.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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