Mitigation of targeted and non-targeted covert attacks as a timing game

Aron Laszka, Benjamin Johnson, Jens Grossklags

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

15 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider a strategic game in which a defender wants to maintain control over a resource that is subject to both targeted and non-targeted covert attacks. Because the attacks are covert, the defender must choose to secure the resource in real time without knowing who controls it. Each move by the defender to secure the resource has a one-time cost and these defending moves are not covert, so that a targeted attacker may time her attacks based on the defender's moves. The time between when a targeted attack starts and when it succeeds is given by an exponentially distributed random variable with a known rate. Non-targeted attackers are modeled together as a single attacker whose attacks arrive following a Poisson process. We find that in this regime, the optimal moving strategy for the defender is a periodic strategy, so that the time intervals between consecutive moves are constant.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationDecision and Game Theory for Security - 4th International Conference, GameSec 2013, Proceedings
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages175-191
Number of pages17
ISBN (Print)9783319027852
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2013
Event4th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2013 - Fort Worth, TX, United States
Duration: Nov 11 2013Nov 12 2013

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume8252 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other4th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2013
CountryUnited States
CityFort Worth, TX
Period11/11/1311/12/13

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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    Laszka, A., Johnson, B., & Grossklags, J. (2013). Mitigation of targeted and non-targeted covert attacks as a timing game. In Decision and Game Theory for Security - 4th International Conference, GameSec 2013, Proceedings (pp. 175-191). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 8252 LNCS). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02786-9_11