Monitoring an owner. The case of Turner broadcasting

Clifford G. Holderness, Dennis P. Sheehan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Turner Broadcasting illustrates how organizational mechanisms can be adapted to prevent a majority owner from imposing costs on minority shareholders through inept management or opportunistic behavior. These mechanisms involve issuing preferred stock with unusual features, concentrating its ownership among a small group of investors, allowing the new preferred shareholders to elect several directors, and requiring supramajority approval of major management decisions by a reconstituted board of directors. The alienability of the preferred stock is restricted to help insure that its ownership stays concentrated and in the hands of those with the specific knowledge and incentives to be effective monitors.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)325-346
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of Financial Economics
Volume30
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1991

Fingerprint

Ownership
Owners
Monitoring
Preferred stock
Broadcasting
Investors
Management decisions
Opportunistic behavior
Incentives
Costs
Shareholders
Board of directors
Minority shareholders

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Strategy and Management

Cite this

Holderness, Clifford G. ; Sheehan, Dennis P. / Monitoring an owner. The case of Turner broadcasting. In: Journal of Financial Economics. 1991 ; Vol. 30, No. 2. pp. 325-346.
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Monitoring an owner. The case of Turner broadcasting. / Holderness, Clifford G.; Sheehan, Dennis P.

In: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 30, No. 2, 01.01.1991, p. 325-346.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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