Multilateral Bargaining

Vijay Krishna, Roberto Serrano

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

119 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study a multilateral bargaining procedure that extends Rubinstein's alternating offer game to the case of n players. The procedure captures the notion of consistency in the sense familiar in cooperative game theory and we use it to establish links to the axiomatic theory of bargaining.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)61-80
Number of pages20
JournalReview of Economic Studies
Volume63
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1996

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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