Multiperiod subscription pricing for cellular wireless entrants

X. Hu, Y. Shan, G. Kesidis, S. Sarkar, R. Dhar, S. Fdida

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider a two-player game involving a large incumbent (or incumbent oligopoly) and small entrant into a cellular-wireless access provider marketplace. The entrant's customers must pay roaming charges. We assume that the roaming charges are transparent to the user and regulated to prevent an incumbent from creating barriers to entry in the marketplace. To be able to reckon suitable (regulated) roaming charges, in this paper we consider a potentially stricter model of competition than [7] (though still not all subscribers to the lowest-cost provider), and a revenue function for the entrant that considers future revenue streams when its deployment is greater and its customers therefore do not roam as much, i.e., a multiperiod/longitudinal revenue model.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2016 50th Annual Conference on Information Systems and Sciences, CISS 2016
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages326-330
Number of pages5
ISBN (Electronic)9781467394574
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 26 2016
Event50th Annual Conference on Information Systems and Sciences, CISS 2016 - Princeton, United States
Duration: Mar 16 2016Mar 18 2016

Publication series

Name2016 50th Annual Conference on Information Systems and Sciences, CISS 2016

Other

Other50th Annual Conference on Information Systems and Sciences, CISS 2016
CountryUnited States
CityPrinceton
Period3/16/163/18/16

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Information Systems

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