Multiple assignment problems under lexicographic preferences

Hadi Hosseini, Kate Larson

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    2 Scopus citations

    Abstract

    We study the problem of allocating multiple objects to agents without transferable utilities, where each agent may receive more than one object according to a quota Under lexicographic preferences, wc characterize the set of strategy-proof, non-bossy, and neutral quota mechanisms and show that under a mild Pareto efficiency condition, serial dictatorship quota mechanisms are the only mechanisms satisfying these properties We then extend quota mechanisms to randomized settings, and show that the random serial dictatorship quota mechanisms (RSDQ) are envyfree, strategy-proof, and ex post efficient for any number of agents and objects and any quota system, proving that the well-studied Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) satisfies envyfreeness when preferences are lexicographic.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publication18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019
    PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
    Pages837-845
    Number of pages9
    ISBN (Electronic)9781510892002
    StatePublished - 2019
    Event18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019 - Montreal, Canada
    Duration: May 13 2019May 17 2019

    Publication series

    NameProceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
    Volume2
    ISSN (Print)1548-8403
    ISSN (Electronic)1558-2914

    Conference

    Conference18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019
    CountryCanada
    CityMontreal
    Period5/13/195/17/19

    All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

    • Artificial Intelligence
    • Software
    • Control and Systems Engineering

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